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iv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff Appellee,

:

v.

:

DAN APPIS,

:

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 20000255-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a sentence entered on a guilty plea to theft, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1973). This Court has jurisdiction of
the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court properly sentence defendant to the statutory prison
term for his third degree felony, rejecting in the process defendant's request for an
inpatient alcohol treatment program?
Standard of Review: On appeal, sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. See State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120-21 (Utah App. 1995). An abuse
of discretion may occur if the actions of the sentencing judge were "inherently unfair," if

the judge imposed a ''clearly excessive sentence" or imposed a sentence without
considering all the legally relevant factors, or if the sentence exceeds the legal limits.
State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997); see also State v. Gibbons, 779
P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989); State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996);
State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995). An abuse of discretion may be found
on appeal only if the appellate court concludes that "'no reasonable [person] would take
the view adopted by the trial court.'" Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651 (quoting State v.
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)).
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court violate Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(6) (1999)
when it did not set forth specific facts supporting its imposition of a statutory sentence
that did not involve minimum mandatory terms?
Standard of Review: Issues raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed for
plain error or exceptional circumstances. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993).
Because defendant does not raise plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal,
defendant may not receive review of this issue. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, n. 5
(Utah 1995).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of rele.vant constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the
resolution of the issues presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief,
including:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404 (1991) (each in Add. A).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with theft, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1973). R. 1. At his arraignment hearing,
defendant pleaded guilty as charged. R. 35-37. The trial court ordered the preparation of
a presentence investigation report [PSI]. Id. During the initial sentencing hearing,
defendant took issue with alleged errors in the PSI and the trial court postponed
sentencing for 30 days and ordered the preparation of a diagnostic evaluation. R. 45.
After examining the evaluation, taking into account alleged errors identified by
defendant, and hearingfromthe parties, the judge sentenced defendant to an
indeterminate term of zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison for the third degree
felony. R. 58, 61.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant and Lara Prather first met around the end of March 1999, at a bar in
Moab, Utah.1 R. 71:2. Upon learning that defendant was homeless and suffering from
injuries, Prather invited defendant to stay at her home.2 Id, While residing with Prather,
Defendant and Prather had a sexual relationship which evolved intofriendship.Id,
Defendant prevailed upon Prather's generosity to receive food, drugs, alcohol and
cigarettes. Id, Shortly thereafter, while under the influence of alcohol, defendant left
Prather's home and stole her wedding ring to purchase additional alcohol. Id, at 2, 7.
Defendant sold the ring for cash at a bar in Moab, Utah. Id, at 2
On April 29, 1999, Detective Steve White confronted defendant and obtained a
confession. Id. Defendant was arrested and charged with theft, a third degree felony.
Id, Defendant posted bail and then left the State, failing to appear at his preliminary
hearing.3 Id, Soon thereafter, defendant was arrested in California and brought back to
Utah for arraignment. Id.

l

The facts are taken from the PSI, including both defendant's version and the
official version of the events.
2

Defendant claims he sustained injuries during afightwith some individuals in
Moab, Utah. He suffered broken bones and other injuries. R.72: PE, p. 4 {See supra.
note 5).
defendant claims that he was unable to attend the preliminary hearing due to his
subsequent incarceration for a drug offense while in San Diego, California. R. 71:7-8; Br.
of Aplt. at 2.
4

ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Point I: Defendant fails to establish that the sentencing court did not give full
consideration to all relevant sentencing factors or that his sentence was "clearly
excessive." All the mitigating factors identified by defendant were presented to the
sentencing court through the PSI, the diagnostic evaluation, defendant, or defense counsel
at the sentencing hearing. The court also had before it defendant's substantial criminal
history including arrests for 12 different drug/alcohol-related offenses over the past seven
years, his thirteen year drug and alcohol problem, his unsuccessful completion of a
juvenile probation and two adult probations, his referral to a local residential treatment
program and eligibility denial due to defendant's poor employment record, crime record
and security risks, his unsuccessful completion of the court ordered Salvation Army ARC
residential treatment program and the program's unwillingness to allow defendant to
reenter, his admission of several violent encounters, his violent encounter with another
inmate while in the Grand County Jail during the diagnostic evaluation, and his admission
of previously living with and stealingfromtwo other women who had also taken
defendant into their homes. The record fully supports the lower court's determination to
sentence defendant to the Utah State Prison.
Point II: There is no merit to defendant's claim that the sentencing judge violated
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(6) by failing to articulate the facts supporting imposition of
the indeterminate prison term provided by statute for defendant's third degree felony
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conviction. Section 76-3-201(6) applies to crimes punishable by minimum mandatory
sentences and, hence, does not apply in this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO THE INDETERMINATE
STATUTORY TERM OF IMPRISONMENT IN LIEU OF AN
INPATIENT REHABILITATION PROGRAM
Defendant asserts that the sentencing judge abused his discretion by failing to
evaluate the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this case and by failing to
consider his need for alcohol rehabilitation. Br. of Aplt. at 4-18. Specifically, defendant
contends that the judge considered only the alleged biases of the diagnostic evaluation
and failed to mention Dr. Matthew Park's assessment and recommendations in
defendant's psychological evaluation. Id. at 7-17. Defendant claims that the absence of
any violent conduct in his criminal history, his age, the fact that the crimes he committed
were alcohol-related incidents, together with his desire to obtain treatment for his
alcoholism, deserve serious and careful consideration by the sentencing court. Id. at 6-13.
A.

The Sentencing Decision
The PSI investigator listed relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances as

follows:
Aggravating Circumstances
-Established instances of repetitive criminal conduct.
6

-Victim was particularly vulnerable.
-Offender's attitude is not conducive to supervision in a less restrict setting.
-Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to arrest.
Mitigating Circumstances
-Offender is young.
R. 71:14. The PSI recommended that a diagnostic evaluation be performed to further
determine defendant's needs. Id. at 9-10. At defendant's initial sentencing, defendant
was allowed an opportunity to challenge the PSI, and the sentencing judge ordered that a
diagnostic evaluation be done.4 R. 45.

The diagnostic evaluation warned that treatment

programs would only provide defendant with psychological insights that would equip
defendant in becoming a more skilled manipulator, and therefore recommended
incarceration. R. 71:9-10. At defendant's final sentencing, both he and his counsel
presented the court with the reasons they believed he should receive alcohol rehabilitation
in lieu of incarceration. R. 78:8-10. In an expression nearly tantamount to invited error,
defendant stated, "[m]y crimes are unjustifiable. If the courts feel safer with me being
incarcerated, then so be it." Id. at 10. Thereafter, the court made the following ruling:
I'm impressed with the report, that it's covered all of the necessary issues
and that it's accurate. And that where the defendant takes issue with the
report, that his position is incorrect. And [] it's really a very through [sic]

4

At defendant's initial sentencing, defendant alerted the court to certain alleged
inaccuracies in the PSI.. R. 45. However, defendant does not appeal the trial courts
treatment of his objections to the PSI. See State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404 (Utah 1999)
(Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 requires that the trial court make a determination of the
accuracy of the PSI on the record).
7

well thought out and articulated report. I'm going to follow the
recommendation.
Id. at 11 (in Add. B). The sentencing judge then imposed the indeterminate sentence
prescribed by statute: zero-to-five years in prison. Id.; See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203(3). In his closing remarks, the judge explained that defendant would have an
opportunity while incarcerated, to prove that he has changed. R. 78:11.
B.

The Standard of Review
The sentencing decision "rests entirely within the discretion of the [trial] court,

within the limits prescribed by law." State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App.
1997) (additional quotations omitted). The decision is not to be reduced to a
mathematical formula in which the number of circumstances determines the sentence.
See State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120-21 (Utah App. 1995). Instead, it is the weight
of the circumstances which is determinative of the sentencing decision. See Wright, 893
P.2d at 1120-21.
On appeal, sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. An
-abuse of discretion may occur if the actions of the sentencing judge were "inherently
unfair," if the judge imposed a "clearly excessive sentence" or imposed a sentence
without considering all the legally relevant factors, or if the sentence exceeds the legal
limits. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651; see also State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, i 135 (Utah
1989); State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Houk, 906 P.2d
907, 909 (Utah App. 1995). An abuse of discretion may be found on appeal only if the
8

appellate court concludes that "'no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by
the trial court.'" Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651 (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887
(Utah 1978)).
C

Reliance Upon the Diagnostic Evaluation and Determination of its Credibility
Are within the Discretion of the Sentencing Court
Defendant contends that during sentencing, the trial court "endorsed" his

diagnostic evaluation and ignored his accompanying psychological evaluation. Br. of
Aplt. at 8-18. Specifically, defendant claims that the trial judge's decision was based upon
a DE which is speculative and deficient in its conclusions and that the PE is a more
correct document. Br. of Aplt. at 9-12.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404 (1991) states that the trial court "may in its discretion"
order a diagnostic evaluation for the purpose of obtaining more detailed information
relevant to sentencing. The diagnostic evaluation is "a tool available the sentencing
judge, if he 'desires more detailed information as a basis for determining the sentence to
be imposed.'" State v. Brown, 111 P.2d 1067, 1067 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Carson,
597 P.2d 862 (Utah 1979)). In the instant case, the trial judge properly relied upon the
conclusions of the diagnostic evaluation in imposing sentence upon defendant.
The Recommendations contained in the diagnostic evaluation are not binding, and
"the trial court may determine the extent to which conclusions in the report should be
accorded weight in the pronouncement of the sentence." Carson, 597 P.2d at 864. A
sentencing judge's discretion approaches error only if a sentencing decision is made in
9

"total ignorance" of the defendant's background. Id. The exercise of discretion "in a
manner unfavorable to the defendant does not indicate an abuse of discretion[.]" Id. At
sentencing, the judge found the diagnostic evaluation to be accurate and "a very thorough
well thought out and articulated report." R. 78:11. Further, the trial judge found that
where defendant pointed out speculation and deficiency issues with the diagnostic
evaluation at the sentencing hearing, such position was incorrect. R. 78:4-8, 11. These
statements illustrate that the sentencing judge was aware of defendant's background.
Accordingly, the sentencing judge was within his discretion to determine the veracity of
defendant's claims of speculation and deficiency, and to decide the appropriate weight
given the conclusions and recommendations of the diagnostic evaluation. Even though
the sentencing judge's decision was unfavorable toward the defendant, the decision was
not an abuse of discretion.
The sentencing judge was not obligated to mention or rely on the psychological
evaluation at sentencing. The psychological evaluation is merely an appendage to the
diagnostic evaluation. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404 (1991) (mentions diagnostic
evaluation only). The "[diagnostic [evaluation" is listed as the reason for referral on the
psychological evaluation. R. 72:PE, p. I.5 Further, the psychological evaluation was
submitted to the sentencing judge by the diagnostic investigator as a part of the diagnostic

5

Citation herein to the psychological evaluation will be to the volume number
stamped on the cover of the diagnostic evaluation, followed by a colon, the abbreviation
"PE" and the internal page number, i.e., R. 72: PE, p. 4.
10

evaluation. R. 72:2; 72:PE, p. 4; Br. of Aplt. at 12. The trial judge was only under an
obligation to be familiar with defendant's background at sentencing. See Carson, 597
P.2d at 864. The trial judge's remarks concerning the diagnostic evaluation implied his
familiarity with defendant's background. R. 78:11. Thus, the fact that the psychological
evaluation was not mentioned at sentencing is of no consequence.
Likewise, the fact that the diagnostic evaluation recommended incarceration
whereas the psychological evaluation recommended treatment, is also of no importance.
The trial judge is placed in the position of determining the proper weight to afford such
evaluations. Id. Perhaps the trial judge recognized that the diagnostic evaluation is based
upon various extended interactions with defendant during the ninety-day period, whereas
the psychological evaluation is based only upon one interview. R. 72:PE, p. 4; 72:4-8.
Additionally, the diagnostic evaluation is founded upon defendant's actions observed
during the ninety-day evaluation, including an altercation between defendant and another
inmate, conversations with previous treatment programs, and the PSI, which contains
statements from defendant's past and present victims and defendant's criminal history as
obtained from police records. R. 72:3, 7-8; 71:3-4, 8. A relatively brief interview with
the defendant is the only source of information for the psychological evaluation. R.
72:PE, pp. 1-5.

The trial judge was within his discretion in accepting the conclusions

found in diagnostic evaluation and rejecting the conclusions in the accompanying
psychological evaluation.
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D.

The Lower Court Properly Considered the Relevant Sentencing Factors
The sentencing judge considered all relevant circumstances. Although the judge

did not articulate a list of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, all the factors
defendant identifies as being overlooked were presented to the sentencing judge through
the PSI, the diagnostic evaluation, the psychological evaluation, defendant's counsel, and
defendant himself.
Specifically, defendant claims that the sentencing court should have considered as
a mitigating factor his alcoholism and his need for alcohol rehabilitation. Br. of Aplt. at
13-18. However, the evidence before the court at sentencing, in the PSI, diagnostic
evaluation, and psychological evaluation, illustrates the following alcohol-related
aggravating factors: defendant's substantial criminal history, including arrests for 12
different drug/alcohol-related offenses over the past seven years (R. 71:4; 72:3); his
thirteen year drug and alcohol problem (R. 71:6-7; 72:2; 72:PE, p. 3); his failure to
complete juvenile probation and two adult probations (R. 71:5; 72:4); his referral to a
local residential treatment program and eligibility denial due to defendant's poor
employment record, crime record and security risks (R. 72:8); his failure to complete the
court-ordered Salvation Army ARC residential treatment program and the program's
unwillingness to allow defendant to reenter because of his theft from other treatment
residents (id.); his admission of several violent encounters (R. 71:1-3); his violent
encounters with other inmates while in the Grand County Jail during the diagnostic
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evaluation (R. 72:7); and his admission to previously living with and stealing from two
other women who had also taken defendant into their homes (R. 72:3-4). The existence
of studies touting the effectiveness of in-patient treatment for alcohol abuse does not
change the fact that defendant has failed to complete such treatment in the past and
merely used the treatment program as a forum for continued criminal activity. R. 72:8.
Defendant's drug and alcohol problem has continued for thirteen years, yet his only
interest in treatment recently came after he was caught committing a crime. Defendant
has shown no personal motivation to obtain treatment.
Further, rehabilitation is not necessarily the primary consideration in sentencing,
and the State is not prohibited from incarcerating defendants "'for purposes other than
rehabilitation.'" State v. Nuttall 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v.
Bishop, 111 P.2d 261, 268 (Utah 1986)). Other proper purposes include deterrence,
punishment, restitution, incapacitation, and protection of society from an individual
"deemed to be a danger to the community." Nuttall, 861 P.2d at 458; State v. Rhodes, 818
P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah App. 1991). While the sentence must be tailored to the particular
defendant, it should also serve the interests of society as well, and those interests include
halting a pattern of law-breaking. State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Utah 1991), cert
denied, 503 U.S. 966, 112 S. Ct. 1576 (1992). To this end, repetitive criminal conduct is
viewed as a "serious aggravating circumstance." State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah
1991).
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Under the facts of this case, imprisonment serves the purposes of punishment and
protection of society. Defendant's substantial criminal history and lengthy involvement
with alcohol demonstrate that whenever he is not in prison, he regularly drinks and
commits criminal acts. The record wholly supports the court's order favoring
incarceration rather than rehabilitation. Defendant's personal statement at sentencing
acknowledged to the court the nature of his crimes and acquiesced to the decision of the
court, stating "[m|y crimes are unjustifiable. If the courts feel safer with me being
incarcerated, then so be it." R. 78:10. The sentencing court listened as defendant
expressed his need for rehabilitation, and then concluded that incarceration was a more
appropriate remedy. Id. at 9-11. In adopting the recommendation of the diagnostic
evaluation {id. at 11), the trial court affirmed the investigator's conclusion that, based
upon defendant's criminal propensities to victimize susceptible individuals and his
manipulative disposition, defendant is a threat to society. R. 72:8-9. Perhaps the most
compelling evidence before the court were the statements of defendant's victims,
expressing extreme fear of the defendant and their wishes that he be incarcerated. R.
71:3; 72:3.
Defendant admitted that all of his crimes were drug/alcohol-related. R. 72:2.
Defendant's inability to control his actions in light of his habits presents a danger to
society. Further, the number of years defendant has engaged in alcohol-related criminal
activity, despite the availability of treatment, and the fact that treatment had proved

14

unsuccessful in the past, minimize his prospects for successful rehabilitation. See Nuttall,
861 P.2d at 457. On these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in emphasizing
societal protection over rehabilitation, especially when the latter is available in prison.
See Nuttall, 861 P.2d at 458 (where the record did not show extreme youth or an absence
of prior criminal behavior, the trial court could properly place more emphasis on
punishment than rehabilitation).
Defendant's comparison of his case with State v. Strunk is misplaced. Br. of Aplt.
at 8-12. Strunk involved a sixteen-year-old boy was convicted of child kidnapping and
aggravated child sexual abuse, and sentenced to consecutive minimum mandatory terms
of life imprisonment. See State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993). Strunk was
remanded because the sentencing court failed to consider the defendant's "extreme youth"
as a mitigating factor. Id. at 1302. However, in this case, defendant was 24 years old
when he committed theft. Br. of Aplt. at 9. As compared to a 16-year-old, a 24-year-old
adult is not, for mitigating purposes, extremely youthful. See In re G. T.K., 878P.2d 1189
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (juvenile's age- less than 18-years-old, seen as mitigating factor);
State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990) (same). Additionally, as explained below,
defendant's indeterminate sentence awarded under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1999), is
distinguishable from the minimum mandatory sentence awarded in Strunk.
In view of the weighty aggravating circumstances in this case, and the lack of
mitigating circumstances, it cannot be said that "'no reasonable [person] would take the
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view adopted by the trial court.'" Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651 (quoting Gerrard, 584 P.2d
at 887). Accordingly,.the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing
imprisonment in lieu of inpatient alcohol treatment.
POINT II
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S FELONY CONVICTION IS NOT
PUNISHABLE BY A MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE, THE
SENTENCING JUDGE NEED NOT COMPLY WITH SECTION 763-201(6)
Defendant argues that the trial judge committed reversible error because he failed
to include on the record his reasons "for imposing the maximum five-year penalty" for
defendant's felony charge, as is required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(6) (1999).6 Br.
of Aplt. at 18-19. However, this statute does not apply to this case.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(6) provides:
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.

(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons
for imposing the upper or lower term.

defendant cites to section 76-3-201(5) of the 1953 volume of the code. However,
in 1993, a new subsection (5) was added. The challenged provision in the statute is now
found in subsection (6), to which the State cites herein.
16

This statute does not apply to any indeterminate term of imprisonment, as
defendant contends. Br. of Aplt. at 5. By its express terms, the statute applies only to
offenses which are punishable by minimum mandatory prison terms. See State v. Elm,
808 P.2d 1097, 1098-99 (Utah 1991) (applying section 76-3-201(5) to sentencing under
the minimum mandatory procedures). In contrast, defendant's offense is punishable by
"a[n indeterminate] term not to exceed five years" in the state prison. Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-203(3) (1999). Accordingly, any failure of the sentencing court to comply with
section 76-3-201(6) would not amount to error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's sentences.
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ?6

day of September, 2000.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

r

. COLEMERE
Assistant Attorney General
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